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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the article is to initiate a dialogue between sociology and philosophy, in 
order to clarify the relationship between ontology and society, subjectivity and the 
massification process and between the need for meaning and the spread of nihilism. 
The starting points of my analysis are Giddens’ claim that the formation of identity 
in contemporary society requires ontological trust and Touraine’s thesis of the end 
of society which calls for the formation of subjectivity. In the dialogue between phi-
losophers such as Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, Soren Kierkegaard, Karl 
Jaspers and sociologists such as Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Anthony Giddens 
and Alain Touraine, I reflect on the meaning of ontological trust, the way in which it 
can be achieved and why today it has become central to the sociological debate. The 
fruit of this dialogue is that what was once considered society’s role is now recog-
nized as the burden of the individual himself. For this reason ontological trust is 
fundamental for the formation of a strong and stable identity, for overcoming nihil-
ism and finding new meaning and for the affirmation of the ethic of responsibility. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article I would like to reflect on a series of issues that I consider es-
sential to understand the nature of the social-historical period we live in. I 
would like, in particular, to address the question of the “destiny of modern 
man” in contemporary society. By destiny I mean “the individual social-
existential experience”. 
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At the beginning of the modern era, man1 had certainties. Rationalization 
and secularization taught him that he was the author of social order, and 
believing in those tools helped free him from the yoke of tradition. Science, 
for instance, gave the impression that one could control nature and with it 
control the development of the forces of production. Politics had secured the 
control of national boundaries and, most of all, the certainty of control of the 
good functioning of democracy. Modern man had built his myths: progress, 
freedom and equality, and thanks to them he thought he would live in the 
golden age. 
From the beginning of modernity until today there have been profound 
changes that have led some philosophers and sociologists to speak of post 
modernity (Lyotard 1979), or of late modernity (Giddens 1990, 1991). Even 
if it is hard to believe that we are at the end of an era and at the beginning of 
a new one, it is evident that the certainties of early modern man have been 
lost by contemporary man who lives in a society where risk rather than secu-
rity is the prevalent condition (Beck 1992), where radical individualism has 
replaced solidarity, where free competition and the ideology of the fittest are 
the new myths. It is not by chance that the British sociologist Anthony Gid-
dens, serious observer of contemporary societies, has mentioned the necessi-
ty to rely on “ontological trust” in order for the individual to face deep 
uncertainties of contemporary society. Or the French sociologist Touraine, 
who believes that only strong subjectivity, which implies self- reflection and 
the strength to accept the responsibility for actions taken, is an answer to the 
end of society. By the end of society Touraine means the end of solidarity 
(Touraine and Khosrokhavar 2000). 
Neither sociologists believe that social struggle is a valid opposition to 
the uncertainties of contemporary society, on the contrary they find the an-
swer in the individual himself. The individual must be able to find in himself 
the security the society does not guarantee as well as the integrity that will 
make him responsible toward himself and the other. For this reason, ontolo-
gy is considered for the first time so crucial in the sociological literature. A 
dialogue with philosophy is then in order, given that ontology has always 
been a philosophical field. I will address in particular the question of how 
ontology and society are connected, in order to clarify how ontological trust 
as well as strong subjectivity can be achieved. My thesis is that the search 
for meaning is what connects the two, and self-reflection is the way mean-
ings are found. 
The Greek tragedies have shown the central role the quest for meaning 
has in one’s life and how it can be fulfilled through the process of self-
reflection (know yourself). Modern man, and more so contemporary man has 
                       
1 I use the term man, and the pronoun he, in the general meaning of human kind.  
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lost the capacity for self-reflection because he has been trained to see in-
strumental rationality as the only valid tool for acquiring knowledge. Weber 
has been the main interpreter of the process of rationalization which he saw 
as the main feature of modernity. The main consequence of such one-
dimensionality has been the loss of meaning and the loss of the tragic, which 
is the inability of man to reach that level of reflection where the truth about 
existence is discovered: 
 
Man cannot return to an immediacy without reflection, without losing him-
self: he can, however, follow this path to its end so that rather than succumb 
to reflection, he can reach his own foundation by means of it...Therefore, in-
finite reflection, precisely through its limitlessly mobile dialectic, is the con-
dition of freedom...In this encounter Existence is given to itself as a gift so 
that by giving itself up to infinite reflection, it fully masters it (Jaspers 1986 
[1883-1969], 43-44). 
 
Contemporary man instead finds himself in an iron cage (Weber) 
and nihilism is his answer, confining himself to an existential desert and at 
the same accepting to be part of the mass society which sees the individual 
as a small cog on a big machine: 
 
Today the spirit of religious ascetism- whether finally, who knows?- has es-
caped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical 
foundations, needs its support no longer […] No one knows who will live in 
this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development 
entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas 
and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of 
convulsive self-importance (Weber 2002 [1904-1905], 124). 
 
Weber was inspired by Nietzsche who declared that modern man suffers 
from the problem of giving an answer to that screaming question , ‘To what 
purpose do we suffer?’ (Nietzsche 1956 [1887]). 
In this article I will first of all define the meaning of ontology and its link 
to the social sphere; furthermore, taking off from the reflections of Durk-
heim and Weber, I will move on to consider the social-existential drama of 
contemporary man: being between anomy and the iron cage. I then consider 
how contemporary man can overcome this social-existential condition, and 
become an individual rather being just a member of the masses, with a new 
emphasis on self-reflection and the quest for meanings. These two can save 
contemporary man from being stultified in a condition of ignorance about his 
destiny, believing that the struggle for survival is the only meaning of life 
and the ideology of the fittest the only way to face it. 
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1. ONTOLOGY: FROM BEING TO EXISTENCE 
Heidegger defines ontology as ‘the doctrine of being’ which deals with gen-
eral definitions of being (Heidegger 1999, 1)2. He further clarifies his idea 
stating that being must be understood as ‘Being in the world’. It is clear that 
for Heidegger the ontological question of being cannot be considered in ab-
stract terms, but rather in relation to socio-historical reality. The main ques-
tion concerns then the relationship between the I and the world. For 
Heidegger the “I” is immersed in the world and understanding his being in 
the world, understands his Dasein (existence). In his act of understanding 
there is also his freedom to transcend the limitations because he can make a 
choice and therefore he can make his existence his own project. 
Heidegger distinguishes between authenticity and inauthenticity. 
The individual who is able to care about his being in the world, therefore ex-
ercising his freedom, is authentic, rather the individual who accepts the limi-
tations, in other words accepts his condition without intervening with his 
own project is inauthentic (Warnock 1970). Being in the world thus means 
both to be determined and at the same time to have the possibility of over-
coming the limitations, which is an act of freedom. 
The philosopher Jaspers further clarifies the relationship between the I 
and the world: 
 
The animal is bound to a natural fate which automatically fulfils itself in ac-
cordance with natural laws. Man is likewise bound but in addition he has a 
destiny the fulfilment of which lies in his own hands. Nowhere, however, do 
we find man as a completely rational being; he is borne along by natural ne-
cessity, which reaches into the furthest ramifications of his reason. In earlier 
centuries the imagination of men conceived of angels as pure intelligence. 
Man, however, is himself neither animal nor angel; he shares the condition of 
both but the existence of neither (Jaspers 1968 [1923], 8). 
 
For Jaspers, one’s possibility to fulfil his destiny is also the reason for his 
fragility since freedom gives him infinite possibilities which could be the 
cause of illness: 
 
Here the incompleteness and vulnerability of human beings and their freedom 
and infinite possibilities are themselves a cause of illness. In contrast with an-
imals, man lacks an inborn, perfected pattern of adaptation. He has to acquire 
                       
2 The reflection on being has a long philosophical tradition. I consider only those authors who 
have emphasized the relationship between the ontological sphere and the socio-historical 
conditions. 
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a way of life as he goes along. Man is not merely pattern, he patterns himself. 
In so far as he is merely pattern, he is nearer to the animals (Jaspers 1968 
[1923], 8). 
 
Jaspers then uses the concept of psyche for describing the experience of 
Being in the world: 
 
Psyche is not to be regarded as an object with given qualities but as ‘being in 
one’s own world’, the integrating of an inner and outer world’: “among these 
categories is that of life as an existence in its own world since all life reveals 
itself as a continuous interchange between an inner and an outer world (Jas-
pers 1968 [1923], 12). 
 
Jaspers’ definition of being in one’s world adds one aspect with respect to 
Heidegger: he clarifies the relationship between the inner and the outside 
world, putting emphasis on the experience (psyche) rather than on action 
(caring). For Heidegger, in fact, the individual is ‘thrown into world’ (Ver-
fallenstein) and he is able to make his Dasein (existence) through an act of 
caring for the world3. 
Jaspers’ analysis clarifies the central points that interface the relationship 
between the ontological and the social sphere: first the fact that the individu-
al existence develops as a continuous interchange between an inner and an 
outer world, and it is in this exchange that the meaning of existence is found; 
then, the recognition that man shapes his own destiny making choices and 
therein lies his freedom: finally, the recognition that to make choices man 
faces infinite possibilities which may cause illness. For Jaspers then the 
question is not authenticity vs. inauthenticity, but between freedom and ill-
ness. 
The analysis of the two philosophers have shown that the individual is 
not totally controlled and shaped by society. Freedom lies in the I (con-
science), in the ontological sphere, however, the I is immersed in the world, 
therefore must relate to it in order to live his own freedom. The relationship 
between the ontological and the social dimensions is then crucial because it 
is where the individual can overcome his given destiny in order to become 
the creator of his own destiny, within certain limits. 
In conclusion, ontology is that sphere where man stands before infinite 
possibilities which require that he make a choice. In making the choice he 
experiences freedom, because he exercises his will as a project. Socio-
historical reality however is where the infinite possibilities and the act of 
making a choice finds limits that cannot be avoided or ignored since socio-
                       
3 Already the Greeks have recognized the central role played by the psyche, also called the 
soul, in human existence, which they also defined as the place of inner experience.  
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historical conditions are the necessary ground on which his will can be exer-
cised and his project realized. For this reason it is not possible to speak of 
man’s project in general terms, but to define it with respect to the socio-
historical conditions in which he lives4. 
The Greek tragedies represent clearly the link between the ontological 
and the social. They represent the drama of the individual who is forced to 
confront the choices he has made given certain socio-historical conditions, 
that is, the pattern he has chosen for his life, and the unexpected conse-
quences of his choices. For this reason, the Greeks used the word destiny for 
describing human existence. 
Man’s existence has its roots in both the ontological sphere where there 
lies the freedom of the individual and in the social realm, where the con-
straints are. The ontological and the social are then strictly related, to deny 
one means to give a partial view of man’s existence. 
2. DURKHEIM: SOCIETY AS SUI GENERIS ENTITY 
Sociologists have rephrased the link between the ontological and social 
sphere in terms of the relationship between the individual and society. This 
question is at the centre of Durkheim’s sociological analysis. He recognizes 
a primacy of society arguing that the individual needs society because with-
out its norms and rules, and, above all, without society in its symbolic di-
mension, man would be in chaos. 
For Durkheim man has two parts: the materialistic part and the spiritual 
part. The former is dominated by infinite desires which must be controlled 
by the latter. The spiritual part comes into life through the internalization of 
society as a sui generis entity. With the expression sui generis entity Durk-
heim wants to underline the symbolic nature of society. He explains it argu-
ing that the symbolic is triggered by the feelings of gratitude which 
transform the group into a sacred entity. 
Given that it is the individual conscience that can attribute a symbolic 
meaning to something, we can argue that even though Durkheim wants to 
avoid recognizing an independent role of the individual conscience, and for 
this reason most of his critics have accused him of social determinism, he is 
forced to bring it in as the place where the group’s transfiguration into a sa-
cred entity occurs. He does not speak of freedom and choices, but of the in-
                       
4 The question of the relevance of ontological trust is also present in the psychoanalytic litera-
ture. Particular authors such as Erik Erikson (1963), Peter Laing (1963 [1950]), have ad-
dressed the fundamental importance of the formation of trust as result of the interaction with 
the mother. In such interaction they also see the beginning of a social relationship. 
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dividual need to be connected to a superior entity, which inspires respect and 
submission, both expressions of the feeling of the sacred. Even though 
Durkheim does not mention the ontological sphere, de facto he introduces it 
because the ontological sphere is where the capability for transfiguration is, 
which is the feeling of the sacred. 
The role of the sacred in the formation of the social bonds between the 
individual and society emerges very well in his work The Elementary Forms 
of Religious Life (1965 [1912]). Durkheim was a structuralist, he believed 
that, in spite of social changes, certain structures remain the same. This is 
particularly true of the fundamental connection between the individual and 
society. In order to explain it, he thought it better to analyse this relationship 
in primitive society where it was still very strong. The social life of primitive 
man was grounded in the sacred, whereas modern man has a far weaker con-
nection with it and for this reason where once there were social ties there is 
now individualism, where once there were meaning now there are patholo-
gies. Pushed by his commitment to construct sociology as a science (Jones, 
1998), he saw the source of the sacred in the group’s ties, however group ties 
could have such role only if perceived as sacred. Nevertheless, for Durkheim 
individual consciousness is grounded on collective consciousness therefore 
he denies the existence of the ontological sphere as separate from the social 
one5. There is then in Durkheim’s theory of society as a sui generis entity a 
twist that partially legitimizes the criticism of him as being a reductionist. 
However, I believe that the definition of society as a sui generis entity and 
social fact as res lose their deterministic character if interpreted in a phe-
nomenological way, as the following quotation illustrates: ‘It is the Sache, 
res, the question that must be analyzed, as it presents itself, not in its factu-
ality, on the contrary in its essentiality’ (Bello 1992, 29). 
The closeness to the phenomenological view emerges also if we consider 
the development made by Edith Stein, pupil of Husserl, with respect to the 
phenomenological method. Edith Stein, in her seminal work on empathy that 
she developed in her dissertation, moves Husserl’s emphasis from the tran-
scendental ego to the relation with the other6. 
Edith Stein wrote her dissertation in 1911, the year Durkheim wrote his 
“Communication to the International Congress of Bologna”, where he clari-
fies the difference between value and reality judgment. The following year, 
                       
5 The relationship between a symbol of the sacred and the formation of positive feelings is 
also present in the work of C.G. Jung. Both authors share the idea that the symbol of the 
sacred creates inner unity, and reinforces the sense of identity. 
6 “In her dissertation on empathy, done under Husserl’s supervision, she accepts the method 
elaborated by her teacher and she applies it in a genial way, above all if we think of her young 
age, to the analysis of the intersubjective field, to the knowledge of the other” ( Bello, 1992, 
60). 
MARIOLINA GRAZIOSI 
 
40 
he published The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 1912. Even though 
from two different perspectives they both underline the link between con-
science and feelings, between conscience and the relationship to the other 
(Stein 1989 [1917]). 
Even if Durkheim speaks of collective feelings and not of a dyad, the 
similarities with the German philosopher lie in the recognition of the link be-
tween conscience and feelings. St. Augustine and the medieval mystics, who 
also underlined the relationship between love and conscience, between God 
and conscience, already saw such a link. In their understanding, the spiritual 
man prevails over rational man, and conscience is not grounded in Cartesian 
doubt but on feelings. 
The same view is shared by a few critics of modernity, for instance 
Simone Weil, the French philosopher who was trained in the Cartesian 
method, which she abandoned for mysticism and the rediscovery of spirit 
beside reason (Weil 1999). The same view was shared by the Spanish phi-
losopher Maria Zambrano who in her book Man and the Divine, sustains that 
at the origin of perception there is the sacred: “There are yet neither “things” 
nor beings in this situation; they become visible only after the gods appear 
and have been given names and shapes. Gods seem to be, then, a form of 
agreement with reality” (2001, 26). Zambrano continues her reflections say-
ing: […] the initial primal relationship of man with the divine does not occur 
in reason, but in delirium. Reason will channel delirium into love’. Further, 
she adds: ‘the supremacy of psychiatry coincides with the sacred, the divine 
not yet revealed’ (2001, 24). 
Durkheim’s emphasis on religion thus means for him the refusal of the 
Cartesian view and of the materialistic view. His evaluation of primitive 
man, because of his roots in the sacred, is an implicit critique of modern 
man, who has lost such roots. Moreover, Durkheim, valuing the religious 
life of primitive man, has refused a linear view of history, and with it the 
idea that modernity is the most advanced stage of humankind and has noth-
ing to learn from the past. On the contrary, modern man, according to Durk-
heim, must rediscover the primitive man in himself in order to go back to 
his roots, to the deep emotional ties with the group, to the sacred, even 
though the idea of the sacred might have a different content. 
The Jewish man, grounded in the Old Testament, discovers the New Tes-
tament, and with it the idea that law is connected to deep feelings of com-
munion. Durkheim’s reductionism is thus only apparent. 
3. INDIVIDUALISM AND THE CULT OF MAN: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION? 
Durkheim’s deep interest in Religion emerges in the letter that he sent to the 
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English priest, Simon Deplaige, Durkheim’s contemporary, who attacked 
him on a series of articles published by the Revue Neoscolastique. Deplaige 
accused Durkheim of having raised society to a level superior to that of the 
individual. Durkheim answered the English priest with a series of letters he 
wrote to the editor in which he underlines the profound impact his discovery 
of the role religion plays in society had on him. After making this discovery 
in 1895, his way of thinking changed: “This reorientation was entirely due to 
the studies of religious history which I had just undertaken, and notably to 
the reading of the works of Robertson Smith and his school’ (Durkheim 
1907, 612-613). 
He accused then, Modernity, with its loss of roots, with its separation of 
feelings from reason, of causing social and individual neurosis. This is ex-
plained by Durkheim as the fading of the link between the individual and the 
group, between the individual and the symbolic. He defines this situation 
with the concept of anomy; one of the main symptoms is the increased rate 
of suicides (Durkheim 1951 [1897], 924). 
Bellah in his introduction to Durkheim’s sociology of morality poses the 
question whether for Durkheim the increase in suicides might be a symptom 
of a pathological society. The American sociologist recognizes that Durk-
heim considers it a sign of sickness of modern society, together with the ap-
pearance of pessimism. He concludes that for Durkheim the problem is one 
of meaning, of man knowing the purpose of his existence and of legitimate 
standards for judging his own actions (Bellah, 1973, p. xxx). Durkheim, the 
scientist, has never been separated from the social reformer, who believed 
that history can not go backward and for this reason saw the good side of 
individualism. Given that individualism fosters the cult of the individual a 
new religion can develop which can renew the feeling of the sacred: 
 
Society has consecrated the individual and made him pre-eminently worthy 
of respect. His progressive emancipation does not imply a weakening but a 
transformation of the social bonds. The individual does not tear himself from 
society but is joined to it in a new manner, and this is because society sees 
him in a new manner and wishes this change to take place (Durkheim 1924, 
72). 
 
The cult of man helps the individual to overcome his egoistic attitudes 
and to reach a level that obliges him to come out of himself and relate to 
others: 
 
If, moreover, we remember that the collective conscience is becoming more 
and more a cult of the individual, we shall see what characterizes the morality 
of organized societies, compared to that of segmental societies…It only asks 
that we be thoughtful of our fellows and that we be just, that we fulfil our du-
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ty… (Durkheim 1947 [1893], 407-408). 
 
Even though Durkheim does not speak of subjectivity or self-reflection, 
he is forced to see that the features of modernity require that the individual 
himself become more aware of the need to respect the other and to be just 
with the others. Before, Durkheim saw society having such role, but with 
the affirmation of individualism he was forced to accept that the same role 
can only be fulfilled by the individual conscience, without an external au-
thority. 
4. THE PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW: THE LOSS OF TRAGIC AND NIHILISM 
The analysis of the ontological drama and how nihilism is the answer to it in 
modern times has been carried on by the existentialist philosophers, among 
whom I focus on Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Jaspers. The analysis of Nie-
tzsche’s and Jaspers’ are particularly relevant given that their works have 
deeply influenced Max Weber’s analysis of modernity and his claim that 
modern man is living in an iron cage. 
Nietzsche’s main thesis is that the culture of the tragic ended with Socra-
tes and it has meant the separation from the tragic and consequently the loss 
of roots. Socrates in fact claimed the superiority of reason over the tragic and 
mythical culture (Nietzsche 2000 [1872]). For Nietzsche the tragic is man’s 
deep experience of the truth of human existence: pain. Pain is the result of an 
intrinsic inner disunity, represented in the Greek mythology with Dionysius, 
who symbolizes a primeval status of division and dismemberment. The 
Greek’s pessimistic view, for Nietzsche, is the truth of life (Nietzsche 2000 
[1872]). 
The Socratic epistemological revolution was followed by another im-
portant epistemological revolution, the advent of the Judeo-Christian view, 
which created a divided conscience whose main imperative is no longer the 
will to power but guilt lived as sin and the need to expiate it. Ancient man 
was at one with his conscience; thus, the main imperative was “know your-
self”, and the main acknowledgment was the recognition that the tragic is the 
essence of life. Christianity has replaced the tragic with the idea of salvation, 
substituting the Greek pessimistic view with guilt and the fear of sin 
(Niezsche 1956 [1887]. 
With the advent of modernity, another epistemological revolution oc-
curred. Gradually, the knowledge that God is dead replaced the Cristian faith 
with nihilism. Nevertheless, man cannot endure nihilism. He must find a 
way to discover new values and with them to reach a new meaning of life 
(Nietzsche, 1995 [1883-1891]. 
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Kierkegaard has also analysed the consequences of the process of secu-
larization and rationalization in Modern Times. He argued that modernity 
has left the individual entirely to himself, making him believe that he is his 
own creator: a belief that has transformed guilt into sin, and pain into re-
morse. This nullifies the tragic (Kierkegaard 1959 [1843], 147). Anxiety has 
replaced it, feeling the entirety of his sorrow at the present moment, and his 
pain is without meaning. The main consequence is madness: 
 
Anxiety is in this sense a truly tragic category, and the old saying: quem deus 
vult perdere, primum dementat, in truth rightfully applies here (Whom the 
God would destroy he first makes mad (Kierkegaard 1959 [1843], 152-153). 
 
Both philosophers recognize that man’s deepest experience is an experi-
ence of chaos, of disunity, which means deep pain and loneliness which can 
be overcome thorough the transvaluation of values, that is the overman (Nie-
tzsche), or through a leap of faith (Kierkegaard). 
Kierkegaard illustrates how the leap of faith saves one from anxiety in his 
book Fear and Trembling. In his poetic philosophical style he evokes Abra-
ham’s anxiety, which represents the acceptance of surrender to an unknown 
will. Abraham’s act of trust is the leap of faith thanks to which he conquers 
what he was afraid to lose: Isaac’s life. Together with Isaac’s life Abraham 
obtains the deep transformation of his conscience: the unknown becomes the 
infinite, the experience of nothingness is transformed into the experience of 
the divine and chaos is now cosmos, universe and firmament. Such a miracle 
can occur thanks to man‘s capacity to trust the unknown, that is thanks to a 
leap of faith. Ontological trust and faith go together: “Yet Abraham believed 
and did not doubt, he believed the preposterous” (Kierkegaard 1973 [1844], 
35). Abraham, Kierkegaard says, was the tragic hero who did not say a 
word: 
 
He remained true to his love. But he who loves God has no need of tears, no 
need of admiration, in his love he forgets his suffering, yea, so completely 
has he forgotten it that afterwards there would not even be the least inkling of 
his pain if God Himself did not recall it, for God sees in secret and knows the 
distress and counts the tears and forgets nothing. So either there is a paradox, 
that the individual as the individual stands in an absolute relation to the abso-
lute/or Abraham is lost ( Kierkegaard 1973 [1844], 35). 
 
Faith allows for the formation of the inner relationship grounded on the 
inner relationship with the Other, bringing feelings of communion with him-
self and with the Other. At this point the connection between tragic and on-
tology is clearer. The ontological level, being the place where deep emotions 
and then deep experience is formed, allows for self-
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inner transformation and the emergence of the spiritual man as opposed to 
the natural man, and the world as a spiritual entity. 
Sophocles in his trilogy showed the process of transformation of the natu-
ral man into the spiritual man, from inner disunity to inner unity and to the 
feeling of communion with the Other. In his first tragedy, he describes the 
moment in which the natural man, Oedipus the King, confronts his sins. It is 
a tragic moment in which there is no salvation. Deep emotion characterizes 
it, for self-knowledge is not gained without deep pain (Sophocles 1941 [456 
b.c.]). In the following tragedy, Oedipus at Colonus, Sophocles describes the 
process of inner transformation, so where once there was a guilty man, there 
is now a transformed man who has accepted his sins and has found the deep 
meaning of his life. After years of peregrination, Oedipus is ready to find a 
place that he can call his home. He finds it at Colonus, which is part of 
Athen’s territory. Oedipus dies a member of the Athenian community. Leav-
ing Thebes, he was homeless, as a sign of his guilt, now a re-born man he 
had a home, a community to which he belonged. 
Freud, who more than anybody else has taken into consideration the role 
of instincts, has described human destiny governed by the laws of nature 
with the Oedipus myth. Man can be saved from it through culture. Unfortu-
nately, Freud opposes natural man to the rational man (where there was the 
Id there will be the Ego) and in this way he denies the existence of an onto-
logical drama that man lives beyond the instinctive level (Freud 1989 
[1923]). 
Jaspers has also devoted a great deal of his philosophical work to the 
question of the tragic (Jaspers 1953). Through the analysis of Kierkegaard’s 
and Nietzsche’s ideas, whom he sees as addressing the same questions and 
formulating the same view, he underlines the connection between the loss of 
the tragic and the drama of modern man: 
 
Thus in their basic substance they have in common a historical judgement 
about their time. They see the impending nothingness, but both possess 
knowledge of the substance of what was lost... [What is lost is] “infinite re-
flection” through which man can reach the authentic Existence. Modern man 
is left with a form of reflection that is “reasoning without commitment, ... 
dissolution of all authority, …abandonment of all content that gives to 
thought measure, aim, and meaning; in this way, having become an indiffer-
ent game of the intellect and with nothing to restrain it, reason now fills the 
world with noise and dust (Jaspers 1986 [1883-1969], 42-43). 
 
The tragic, on the contrary, is the ceaseless pursuit of the answers to 
questions, and such questions, What is man?, What leads him on, What is 
guilt? What is fate? What are the ordinations valid among men, and where 
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do they come from? What are the Gods?, are directed to the gods . Such in-
cessant questioning does not make the person merely a spectator, but a man 
who is personally involved and for this reason he discovers his limits, his re-
sponsibility, his guilt and his pain. Tragic knowledge, as Jaspers recognizes, 
makes man free because he leaps into transcendence where he finds mean-
ing. The primacy of rationality has separated man from his deep roots, where 
he had to confront pain and disunity, but at the same time he would be in-
volved in a cathartic process that would make him aware of his limits giving 
him however the possibility to transcend them (Jaspers 1953, 34-36). The 
process of transcendence is not the result of the work of Gods and of faith, 
rather the result of the process of self-reflection thanks to which man experi-
ences the deep contradictions of human existence, the antinomies of which 
human existence is made: between freedom and limits, between choices and 
constraints. 
The loss of the tragic, denounced by both the philosophers means the loss 
of the ontological experience, that is, the only one that would make him feel 
that he knows himself. In the process of knowing one’s self, of self-
discovery he also finds himself. On the contrary, the process of rationaliza-
tion forces modern man to think only in an instrumental way, searching for 
rational-technical solutions rather than seeking a reason to exist and a reason 
to overcome one’s self, one’s limits. This is his iron cage. 
5. MAX WEBER AND THE IRON CAGE: THE PHILOSOPHER STATES THE 
PROBLEM; THE SOCIOLOGIST MUST FOLLOW THROUGH 
Weber, besides being a sociologist, was also an economist, an historian, and 
a philosopher. He had a deep philosophical view that influenced his socio-
logical view (Jaspers 1965 [1937])7. He believed in fact that sociology’s 
main goal is to understand the meaning of social actions given that man’s 
search for meaning is the center of man’s existence. Weber analysed the des-
tiny of modern man looking at the process through which meanings are 
formed. Contrary to Durkheim, he has never defined himself as a positivist; 
his epistemological interest has been to frame sociology as one of the sci-
ences of the spirit. In order to avoid introspection, he has chosen history as 
the ground for understanding the origin and the development of the spirit; 
that is, of that original relationship through which man finds fundamental 
meaning. 
In his book, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (1904-
                       
7 Jaspers was a good friend of Weber. At Weber’s death he wrote a necrology in which he 
underlined Weber’s philosophical attitudes (Jaspers, 1989).  
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1905), Weber analyzes the existential condition of modern man in the early 
phase of capitalism. He links the origin of capitalism and its early develop-
ment to the development of the Spirit of Capitalism. He defines it a rational 
conduct of life that assumes the nature of a vocation. The historical reason 
for the formation of this type of personality is the rise of the Protestant Ethic 
(Weber 2002 [1904-1905]). In his book Max Weber and Thomas Mann, 
Goldman maintains that for Weber and for Mann the idea of “a calling” is 
central to understanding the formation of the “occidental personality” (1988, 
4). Both authors went back to the original idea of “a calling” as work done to 
serve God, and they thought that it was this idea that gave the first genera-
tion of capitalists the meaning of their existence. 
With the development of the process of rationalization, however, the in-
ner worldly ethic loses its original meaning concerned with the question of 
salvation, because the instrumental reason becomes dominant, completely 
separate from the fundamental questions. This has also implied a process of 
disenchantment that has replaced the meaning of calling in service to God to 
the secularized notion of work causing a transformation in both individual 
and collective life. It has caused the loss of meaning and the spread of nihil-
ism (Goldman 1988, 2). 
Thomas Mann in his novel Buddenbrooks describes the transformation 
that occurred from the first generation of capitalists to the third 8. The found-
er of the dynasty was primarily a man of faith and secondarily a capitalist, 
while his grandson, Thomas, the last capitalist of the family, loses his faith 
and consequently his role as capitalist does not give him any reason to live. 
Mann describes Thomas as a man divided between his narcissism, which 
causes him to give importance to the material symbols of his wealth, and his 
nihilism, which leads him to find solace in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The 
capitalist who found meaning in life seeing his work as a vocation is dead 
and by the third generation has been replaced by a divided man who even 
though haunted by nihilism struggles to accept it as his only creed. However, 
he knows that such a struggle is in vain because emptiness is his new dimen-
sion: 
 
                       
8 Harvey Goldman in his book on Max Weber and Thomas Mann justifies the comparison of 
the work of a sociologist and a writer in the following way: ‘We are accustomed to seing the 
discourse of social science and literature as quite distinct, concerned in different ways with 
different issues of “outer” world and “inner” world, the one focusing on explaining empirical 
“reality”, the other on “fictional” explorations or representations of themes from that reality. 
But this distinction is unfortunate and artificial, especially for an approach to social science 
that is interpretative rather than causal in its orientation. Such an approach must rely on a 
broader range of cultural experience and expression and a wider set of themes to do its work’. 
(1988, 16). 
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In his hours of gloom- and they were frequent-Thomas Buddenbrooks would 
ask himself what sort of man he really was and what could still justify his 
seeing himself as something better than any of his simple-hearted, plodding, 
and small-minded fellow citizens. The imaginative élan and cheerful idealism 
of youth were gone. To play at work, to work at play, to strive, to direct one’s 
self-serious, half-whimsical ambition toward goals to which one ascribes on-
ly symbolic value – that requires a great deal of vigour, humour, and a breezy 
kind of courage  for debonair, sceptical compromises and ingenious 
half-measures; but Thomas Buddenbrooks felt indescribably weary and list-
less… Because, as soon as he began to think of the end of life as something 
more than a distant, theoretical, and minor necessity and regarded it, instead, 
as imminent and tangible, as something for which one must make immediate 
preparations, he began to brood, to search himself, to examine how things 
stood between him and death and what he thought about matters beyond this 
earthly life. And at his very first attempt to do so, what he found was hope-
less immaturity and a soul unprepared for death….No, when it came to ulti-
mate and highest questions, there was no help from outside - no mediation, 
no absolution, no soothing consolation…before it was too late, he must either 
achieve some clear readiness for death, or die in despair (Mann 1993 [1901], 
593, 631-632). 
 
Thomas Buddenbrooks’ loneliness is so deep because there are no longer 
any shared values and consequently each person is imprisoned within his 
own walls. Even a relationship with his wife and son is prevented by the 
fact that neither shares the values in which he has grown up: “earnest, pro-
found, remorseless, to the point of self-flagellation” (Mann 1993 [1901], 
632). The difference between Thomas’s values and those of his wife and 
son reflects the discrepancy in Thomas’ conscience between the world of 
his ancestors based on Beruf, i.e. hard work and accumulation in the hope of 
salvation, and his inner world which by now is very unstable because it is 
no longer connected to any belief or Weltanschauung. 
The decadence from the first to the last generation becomes very clear in 
Hanno, Thomas’s son. Hanno is reminiscent of the romantic heroes of late 
XIX century and beginning XX century; for them sensitivity is all they 
have, and for this reason it has become a cause of weakness rather than a 
force of inspiration. Mann, influenced by Goethe, portrays Hanno as a per-
son sick in his spirit, unable to find a place in this world, as the following 
words show: 
 
I just want to go to sleep and not have to deal with it. I want to die, Kai! No, I 
won’t amount to anything. I can’t even bring myself to want anything. I do 
not want to be famous. The idea scares me, as if it meant doing something 
wrong (Mann 1993 [1901], 636). 
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Hanno may represent the man of late modernity whose crisis of identity 
reflects the crisis of values of the nation. This is pointed out by Weber and 
Mann as well. They believe that the existential crisis of the individual and 
the crisis of values of a nation go together; one recalls the other, in other 
words they are dialectically related. For instance, values for Weber are col-
lectively defined, however it is the individual conscience that will chose 
which values to make his own. Neither of them, society or individual, can 
do without the other. 
With the decline of consciousness of the bourgeois of the first genera-
tion, the man of virtue, the heirs confront meaninglessness because in a ma-
terialistic culture stultification takes the place of the existential inner 
dialogue for the search for meaning. In his essay Science as vocation, We-
ber underlines the drama of modern man: the inability to face the profound 
questions of existence: life and death: 
 
Now, this process of disenchantment, which has continued to exist in Occi-
dental culture for millennia, and, in general, this “process,” to which science 
belongs as a link and motive force, do they have any meanings that go be-
yond the purely practical and technical? One will find this question arise in 
the most principled form in the works of Leo Tolstoy. He came to raise the 
question in a peculiar way; all his broodings increasingly revolved around the 
problem of whether or not death is a meaningful phenomenon. His answer 
was: for civilized man death has no meaning (Weber 1994 [1918], 286-287). 
 
Modern man is caught in a crisis of meaning, this includes death. The 
end of modern man’s existence will not coincide with the peak of his wis-
dom; on the contrary it will coincide with the collapse of all his certainties 
and the bitter experience of not leaving any sign behind because, after all, 
most discoveries are temporary. Contemporary man is in fact caught within 
the process of technological change which makes each discovery a precari-
ous result, thus also making existence itself obsolete overall (Weber 1994 
[1918], 287). 
Weber clarifies this point when he compares modern man to Abraham, 
who, on the contrary, could see the meaning of his death and therefore of 
his existence: 
 
Abraham, or some peasant of the past, died “old and satiated with life”, in 
terms of its meaning and on the eve of his days, had given to him what life 
had to offer; because for him there remained no puzzles he might wish to 
solve; and therefore he could have had “enough” of life. Whereas civilized 
man, placed in the midst of the continuous enrichment of culture by ideas, 
knowledge, and problems, may become “tired of life” but not “satisfied with 
life”. He catches only the most minute part of what the life of the spirit brings 
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forth ever anew, and what he seizes is always something provisional and not 
definitive, and therefore death for him is a meaningless occurrence. And be-
cause death is meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very 
“progressiveness” it gives death the imprint of meaninglessness (Weber 1994 
[1918], 287). 
 
Weber’s denouncement of the iron cage in which modern man would be 
forced to live is also a denouncement of the formation of the mass man; a 
man who has lost a separate destiny, who has been deprived of his own par-
ticular drama, whose conscience is dominated by ideology and who is fear-
ful to face life as an individual on his own. 
The loss of meaning is not only a drama for the individual; it is also a 
drama for society which is transformed into a dehumanized machine whose 
goal of efficiency can see the extermination of a race as a technical task. 
Bauman in his book Modernity and Holocaust (2001) maintains that the 
Shoah has been possible because of the efficiency of the German bureau-
cracy. Furthermore, the search for meaning was twisted into nationalism 
and the ideology of the supremacy of the race, which both found their main 
expression in the religion of death. Death of the enemy, both outside the 
country and inside the country. The connection with the transcendental was 
thus replaced by the values promulgated from the religion of death: war, 
violence and aggression. 
6. BEYOND NIHILISM: LOOKING FOR A REASON TO EXIST 
If we draw conclusions from the ideas advanced by the authors I have ana-
lyzed in the previous sections, we see that all of them conceive of a strong 
subject that can bring about cultural renewal: a man of faith for Kierkegaard; 
a man able to go beyond his time and his limits (overman) for Nietzsche; a 
tragic man who centres his existence on ‘infinite reflection’ for Jaspers; a 
charismatic leader capable of bringing new values and, then meanings for 
Weber, a man who has man as his main value, for Durkheim. 
All these ideal types have one trait in common: inner trust (ontological 
trust) and the need to find new values that allow modern man to go beyond 
nihilism. In fact, for Kierkegaard, Abraham is a man of faith because he has 
been able to trust God; Nietzsche also evokes trust when he reclaims the 
human above all: man as the highest value, and most of all, man in search of 
himself (“you sought the heaviest burden and you found yourself- it is a bur-
den you cannot throw off…”), who for Jaspers, becomes a man of infinite 
reflection through which he reaches authentic Existence. Weber translates 
philosophical ideas into a sociological view, so the solitary and self-
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reflective man of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Jaspers, becomes the charis-
matic leader, who announces new values and with them a new culture is cre-
ated that will give a meaning to life again. The same is true for the man who 
believes in the religion of the individual, which implies a trust in Man, there-
fore he must find trust in himself. 
The belief in ontological trust has replaced the belief in progress. Neither 
the sociologists nor philosophers, that I have considered, believe blindly in 
progress, the myth of modernity. All of them see and denounce that techno-
logical discoveries and rationalization cause problems in man’s existence as 
well as in society. Weber, for instance, denounces the danger of being 
trapped in an iron cage because the needs of social organization have be-
come stronger than man’s individual needs. The domination of instrumental 
reason has forced man to live in a deserted land, where the seeds of inner life 
have been eradicated. Durkheim has interpreted the same loss in terms of 
moral disorientation, which recalls Kierkegaard’s claim of anxiety as the re-
sult of absence of the inner relationship of the “I” with the “I”9, only possible 
in the presence of a relationship with the transcendental. Finally, Nietzsche’s 
idea of eternal present expresses the same denial of progress and change. 
Nietzsche, in particular, is one of the first philosophers who, contrary to 
Hegel, refused the teleological idea of history and substituted the idea of the 
necessity of a continuous confrontation with the roots, the essence of human 
nature, in order to find those values, those aims that could take man beyond 
himself. Zarathustra is the symbol of such a man, able to go beyond himself; 
not super man, then, but “the higher man”, the man who strives for transfor-
mation. For Kierkegaard too, it is not progress that brings freedom, but the 
possibility for man to choose among the infinite possibilities. Freedom in 
fact is an existential condition besides being a political one. The man who 
confronts infinite possibilities and is able to overcome the anxiety that the 
choice implies is the man with a strong subjectivity. As explained by Jaspers 
the condition of having infinite possibilities can also bring illness rather than 
freedom. For the individual to feel free in the face of infinite possibilities it 
is necessary to be able to establish a strong relationship with himself based 
on a dialogue with the ultimate values. This forms a link between the inner 
and the outer world, which cannot be accomplished without the development 
of a feeling of belonging that is a feeling of communion within and with the 
world. 
On the relationship between the inner and the outer world, I find Jasper’s 
reflections on guilt particularly illuminating. Guilt is the other face of anxie-
                       
9 Kierkegaard maintains that inner unity is the result of the formation of the I with the I, which 
can be formed only through the relationship with God. It is this relationship that forms the 
spiritual man (1973).  
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ty. It is, like anxiety, an ontological and a tragic category, as Sophocles has 
so brilliantly shown in Oedipus the King. It becomes dominant when 
trust/faith is lacking which causes the death of the soul, as Kierkegaard ar-
gues in his work The Sickness unto Death (1973 [1844]). Guilt is present 
when there is the death of the soul. In other words, when there is no internal 
relationship of the I with the I, which, for Kierkegaard, is possible only if 
there is also a relationship with God/transcendental. Man naturally is in a 
state of disunity, perceived as sin and its arising guilt. 
Nietzsche also gives great importance to guilt seen as the cause of the di-
vided conscience of the Christian man. For the German philosopher, the 
Christian emphasis on guilt has imprisoned man, preventing him to live life 
fully. The man of yes should supersede the guilty man. 
Jaspers went beyond the analysis of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, consider-
ing The Question of German Guilt (2001 [1947]). His first statement is: “ No 
one is guiltless” (Jaspers 2001 [1947], 16), then he moves on to enquire 
about guilt, which means responsibility, individual and collective responsi-
bility. He recognizes that the main problem is “that so many people do not 
really want to think […]” (Jaspers 2001[1947], 16). To think is to deal with 
guilt: “for only consciousness of guilt leads to the consciousness of solidarity 
and co-responsibility without which there can be no liberty” (Jaspers 2001 
[1947], 114-115). The process of self-reflection should be carried on at both 
individual and collective levels. Even though the two are different, the latter 
can occur only by way of the former because a real metamorphosis can occur 
in the individual, in many individuals independent of or mutually inspiring 
one another (Jaspers, 2001 [1947], 96). 
A self-reflective man is not then an egoist, but a man who feels responsi-
ble for all his actions, and sees purification from guilt as “an inner process 
which is never ending but in which we continually become ourselves. Purifi-
cation is a matter of freedom […] the premise of our political liberty” (Jas-
pers 2001 [1947], 114). The formation of the subject thus implies a person 
capable of assuming the responsibility of freedom, conceived as the freedom 
to build his own existence, recognizing the consequences of his actions, 
which are his choices. This means not only the formation of a free and re-
sponsible man but also of a responsible citizen: “For only the pure soul can 
truthfully live in this tension: to know about possible ruin and still remain 
tirelessly active for all that is possible in the world” (Jaspers 2001 [1947], 
116). 
The loss of meaning caused by a culture that puts emphasis only on mate-
rialistic needs and the struggle for survival is then the result of a deep inner 
split between feelings and reason10. Such division means the transformation 
                       
10 Richard Sennet speaks in fact of an inner split between the self and the I that characterizes 
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of the ontological level from the siege of emotions and meanings into a res-
ervoir of chaotic feelings that the individual is unable to control. The expres-
sion “the gods have become illness”, uttered by the Swiss psychiatrist and 
psychoanalyst C.G.Jung, means precisely the inability of the individual to 
control and to live meaningfully with his feelings. 
To free modern man from his illness means to free him from solitude 
making him experience the inner unity and the outer community so that feel-
ings can become links, ties, and meanings. This means the creation of a soci-
ety able to recognize that the individual has both material and spiritual 
needs, and to accept that the second is not secondary to the first (Weil 1990 
[1949]). Furthermore, it implies the recognition that new values, and with 
them a new culture, can be formed only by the individual consciousness. It is 
not social struggles, war, class struggle that can save us from the iron cage or 
the desert in which we live. Furthermore, in times of uncertainty and wars all 
over the planet, the question of guilt (everybody is guilty) is a standing ques-
tion. 
7. THE NEED FOR SUBJECTIVITY IN TIMES OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE DEATH 
OF SOCIETY 
Anthony Giddens and Alain Touraine, following Durkheim and Weber, have 
re-proposed the need to find meaning as the way of overcoming man’s social 
existential condition of uncertainty. Both sociologists see a solution in the 
development of subjectivity and in the formation of a strong identity rather 
than in a collective struggle. They are aware that it is not possible to go back 
to a society where community can replace radical individualism and a collec-
tive struggle can defeat free competition. They are also aware that the new 
social condition exposes the individual not only to loneliness, to the feeling 
of being up-rooted, but also to the problem of a profound disconnectedness 
that is the cause of widespread individual and social pathologies (Graziosi 
2015). Finally they are aware that Durkheim’s theory of the formation of a 
new religion has not taken place, while Weber’s theory of the iron cage is 
more and more present. Even though they share the view of social change, 
they give slightly different interpretations of subjectivity. 
Giddens believes that subjectivity can be formed only in the presence of 
ontological trust. He stated so openly (1991), however he does not believe 
that ontological trust can derive from faith, as for instance Kierkegaard be-
lieved, or from inner dialogue with ultimate values, as Weber thought. His 
                                                      
the personality of contemporary man forced to be flexible by the requests of the market econ-
omy (1999).  
DIALOGUE BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
53 
answer is secular, more precisely psychological. He relies in fact on Peter 
Laing’s existential view of schizophrenia. 
In his analysis of schizophrenia, the Scottish psychiatrist recognizes onto-
logical trust as the necessary condition for the development of a healthy per-
sonality. He defines ontological trust as the feeling of being an entity that 
exists in time and has a place in space. This condition is what allows a per-
son to be ontologically born, that is, a presence in the world. Without onto-
logical trust the person does not have a strong identity and therefore he will 
never achieve the secure autonomy necessary for internal coherence and to 
form a relationship between the body and the soul (Laing 1990 [1960]). 
Sharing Laing’s view, Giddens maintains that once there is ontological 
trust a strong identity can be formed through self-reflection. This allows to 
recognize a pattern that ties his life together thus gives meaning and coher-
ence to his existence. Contrary to previous society, identity is not formed by 
the internalization of social roles, nor is it stable over time (Mead 1934), but 
is the result of a narrative constructed by the individual himself reflecting on 
the events of his life, finding a continuous thread that gives them a meaning 
(Cavarero 1997). For Giddens, subjectivity coincides with the activity of 
self-reflection. It is Touraine who gives a broader view. 
For Touraine, the main social change is the death of society, that is the 
absence of strong social ties, strong institutions and a system of collective 
values that characterized the previous stages of modernity. Subjectivity is the 
way the individual can face the death of society, which however for him can 
be developed not thanks to faith but through a process of self-reflection that 
expands consciousness and allows for the formation of the ethic of responsi-
bility toward the other. With respect to this latter aspect, Touraine goes back 
to Weber’s idea. Weber was the first to speak of the need for modern man to 
develop the ethic of responsibility in face of the growing individualism. Eth-
ics has its roots in the individual consciousness, while morality has them in 
the collective consciousness present only if society is strong. Touraine be-
lieves that such a result can be achieved thanks to the new culture that is 
emerging with minority movements, in particular with the enhancement of 
women’s culture (Touraine 2004). 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The main result of the dialogue between philosophy and sociology is the 
recognition that the burden to find meaning, to form a strong identity, to 
form subjectivity, is on the individual. A responsible and reflexive subject 
can replace the emptiness left by the death of society. 
It is the only way in which the individual can escape nihilism, emptiness, 
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moral disorientation, all of which cause inner disconnectedness, and to 
achieve a deep feeling of unity. This social existential condition will allow 
him to conceive of himself as the agent of his own life and therefore to expe-
rience freedom as the will to pursue his goals, without however ignoring the 
presence of social constraints. As the existentialists J.P. Sartre e S. de Beau-
voir maintain, freedom is an ontological aspect and it can be exercised, that 
is have a real experience of it, conceiving existence as a project (Graziosi 
2017). 
The reiteration of the importance of the ontological level by sociologists 
is then mainly due to the new social-existential conditions in which the indi-
vidual can no longer count on collective agents for reaching a better position 
but must confront the growth of inequality, the growth of alienation by him-
self and find the solution in himself. The doubt remains that to build a strong 
subjectivity is a privilege for an elite and not for everyone. It is possible that, 
instead, the future will be a repetition of the past, with the masses becoming 
the protagonist of the revival of populism, going even so far as to pursue au-
thoritarian solutions. Nevertheless, there is always hope that those who are 
able to form a strong subjectivity will denounce the manipulation of the 
masses and work for a culture that increasingly favours the formation of sub-
jects, that is, free responsible individuals. 
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